If you consider the high price placed on one of a kind collectibles, you can note the value placed on being something no one else can have. Economists call items valued for exclusive possession, such as movie memorabilia or works of art, “positional goods.” A positional good has value only insofar as one can possess it and no one else can. Anyone can have a replica, but there is only one original. The difference in value between a unique item and the material that composes it can be thought of as its positional value, the value it accrues through exclusive possession.

Capitalist systems motivate the creation of positional goods because the value of sentiment is unbounded, unlike the cost of labor and materials. A merchant dealing in collectibles can turn a significant profit by purchasing from one party ignorant of the item’s value and selling it to an interested collector. Positional goods can become status signifiers, attracting increased value based on the associated status. Without producing any new material good or fulfilling any need, positional value inflates prices in favor of merchants and to the detriment of consumers.

The sentiment that enables positional value reflects some of humanity’s worse impulses. When a person enjoys positional value, they place an equivalent degree of value on the dissatisfaction of others. One celebrates not what one has, but that someone else does not have it. Embracing positional value then entails embracing another’s deprivation.

From a moral perspective positional value encourages immoral attitudes such as greed and insensitivity to suffering. The separation created between people who have and people who do not enable fragmentation of the community into factions anchored on their status and associated signifiers. Positional goods provide a perpetual wellspring of carrots for the owner class to offer workers in exchange for betraying their class interests. An anarchist should be skeptical of positional goods and positional value, and a communitarian should treat them as a pollutant.

The persuasive utility of positional value appears in the pitch for many scams, threatening the mark with missing out on something significant. The NFT market exploits two forms of positional value, inherent and external. Inherent value refers to the core concept already discussed, but external positional value refers to status signifiers associated with ownership. NFT promoters encourage adoption so that the buyer can be part of the next big movement. Owners create community around NFT collections, as if they have attained membership in a clique of Bored Apes. If you don’t buy any NFTs, you won’t have any stake in the cryptocurrency economy to come. In the end, the value of the asset will increase until no buyers remain. The price plummets, and the status withers.

Many ancient stories concern the rules of hospitality. Every culture has a framework for describing the duties of a householder toward a guest, especially a traveler or stranger in need, and the duties of the guest toward their host. Violation of those rules provide the starting point for epics and tragedies. Given the hazards of travel, one can easily understand how hospitality became a recurring theme in morality and mythology. The householder welcomes the stranger because they can easily imagine themselves with the needs of the stranger. Then stranger accepts what is given gracefully and returns what they can because they would want a guest to treat their house the same way.

Hospitality norms reflect the fundamental role of reciprocity as a moral value. Reciprocity builds trust between individuals. By serving another’s interest and being served in return, one demonstrates regard for the needs and interest of another. Establishing reciprocity provides the foundation for all agreements and organizations.

Simple regard for another’s needs demonstrates respect and allows us to recognize common wants and needs. Despite the wide diversity of individuals, humans share a common set of basic needs, food, shelter, companionship, and recognition. Practicing reciprocity teaches a person these needs and teaches them to recognize the other as commensurable with themselves. In the continuity of self and other, one finds humanity.

Compatibilists argue that free will and determinism can co-exist as long as either concept is diminished to fit within an expanded concept of the other. Free will is consistent with determinism as long as one does not demand unqualified freedom or absolute regularity. In very deep meditation sessions, I sometimes experience volition as phenomenon separate from urges or cognition. I see a desire to end the session, and I have thoughts about ending the session. Nevertheless, the session does not end until I direct a formless push to open the eyes, bow, and stand.

The push is influenced by cause and effect. Hunger, fatigue, anxiety, and enthusiasm can lend it power. Nevertheless, between anticipation of action and acting, there is a moment of decision. I do not need a stronger concept of free will to anchor responsibility for my actions, yet I can also see how previous events direct that decision, lend it strength or present resistance. The decision moment is not absolutely free anymore than the next moment is possible to predict with absolute precision. A consistent account of causation can account for both free will and determinism in the sense presented here.

A study of Epictetus shows how far philosophy has fallen from its roots in Ancient Greece. The foundations of Stoicism are a simple, practical focus on developing durable happiness and freedom from the vicissitudes of fortune. Following the virtue tradition of Aristotle, Epictetus sets out the aims of philosophy as cultivation of oneself, of virtue, and of the means of living well. Like the Buddha, Epictetus argues that living well means forsaking pursuit of transitory goods and focusing on lasting peace through changing one’s attitude toward desire and circumstance. There is nothing in Epictetus that one cannot infer by reflecting on the value of maintaining a broad perspective on incidental events. Epictetus himself reminds his reader that they already know what is needed for happiness. Only deliberate effort to habituate the right attitudes separates the wise from the foolish.

The writing of Epictetus belong to the “wisdom” genre, the set of creative works dedicated to giving practical advice. Wisdom literature often takes an elevated perspective, bringing the reader to a higher level of abstraction where patterns of cause and effect become more accessible. By relating patterns to discrete in-the-moment actions or decisions, one derives principles and practices that support a set of values. All cultures have wisdom literature that composes the inheritance of tradition and value passed down the generations.
A common theme is dissatisfaction with transitory pleasures and seeking liberation from suffering by developing an attitude that places the most value on achieving holistic contentment with oneself and one’s environment. Developing kindness, compassion, forethought, and reflection promotes the development of a lasting freedom from transitory pleasures and pains.

Academic philosophy concerns the minutia of esoteric subjects. Lines of research focus on distinctions that change nothing about human behavior, perception, or experience. Analytic Philosophy, the dominant tradition of the English-speaking world, rejected the study of ethics for much of its early history. Continental Philosophy, dominant in Western Europe, embraces perception and reflection but often twists itself into engaging primarily with its own jargon-laden literature. As a result, academic philosophers demonstrate no marked capacity for wisdom or happiness. Philosophers who do pursue wisdom are either confined to very narrow subfields on the margin of the discipline or do so in a non-professional capacity only.